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THE ‘GHOST’ OF THE
ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE :
AN EXAMINATION INTO
HISTORICAL MYTH-MAKING*
ANTONY BE ST
London School of Economics and Political Science
A B S T R ACT. Even though the argument runs counter to much of the detailed scholarship on the subject,
Britain’s decision in 1921 to terminate its alliance with Japan is sometimes held in general historical surveys
to be a major blunder that helped to pave the way to the Paciﬁc War. The lingering sympathy for the
combination with Japan is largely due to an historical myth which has presented the alliance as a par-
ticularly close partnership. The roots of the myth lie in the inter-war period when, in order to attack the trend
towards internationalism, the political right in Britain manipulated memory of the alliance so that it became
an exemplar of ‘old diplomacy ’. It was then reinforced after 1945 by post-war memoirs and the ‘declinist ’
literature of the 1960s and 1970s. By analysing the origins of this benevolent interpretation of the alliance,
this article reveals how quickly and pervasively political discourse can turn history into myth and how the
development of myths tells us much about the time in which they were created.
I
The role of myths in international history is a topic that has generated growing
attention over the last decade. The stimulus for this development has come from
two directions. First, the rise of cultural history has led to increasing interest in the
degree to which our knowledge of the past is shaped by collective memory. This
perspective characterizes history as an inherently political process in which events
are open to manipulation by both state and society and are used to serve the cause
of inculcating and reinforcing national identity.1 Second, in the ﬁeld of inter-
national relations and political science there has been a new focus on the way in
which decision-makers and the media use, and abuse, historical analogies in order
Department of International History, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE A.Best@lse.ac.uk
* I wish to thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to
quote from the Liddell Hart papers and Mr A. J. Maxse for permission to quote from the Leo Maxse
papers.
1 For an interesting discussion of this approach, see Jan-Werner Mu¨ller, ‘ Introduction, the power of
memory, the memory of power and the power over memory’, in Jan-Werner Mu¨ller, ed., Memory and
power in post-war Europe (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 1–35.
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to justify policy and to simplify the task of interpreting current events. Thus the
exigencies of contemporary politics mean that historical episodes are turned into
shorthand cliche´s devoid of their original complexity.2
How though are mythical interpretations of history formed? Up to now this
issue has not been fully addressed. This is largely because the historians working
in this area have been primarily concerned with the contemporary resonance of
historical myths. Moreover, they have tended to focus on the mythical aspects of
the most familiar controversies, such as interpretations of a particular nation’s
memory of its role during the Second World War, where the topic is too complex
to lend itself to detailed analysis. However, to study how myths emerge is im-
portant, for it is only by understanding their evolution that one can hope to
disentangle historical events from the political rhetoric that surrounds them. This
is clearly a diﬃcult undertaking, especially when the event in question is still a
cause of controversy, but it is possible to simplify this process by identifying and
studying neglected myths that, while born of political dispute, have subsequently
bred orthodox and relatively uncontroversial interpretations of history. This
article looks at one particular example of historical shorthand that has embedded
itself in our reading of the past – the idea that the Anglo-Japanese alliance
was a singularly close relationship and that its abrogation was a short-sighted
mistake – and reveals its roots in the ideological battles of inter-war Britain.
It has long been accepted as a truism in many of the survey studies of British
imperial and diplomatic history in the twentieth century that the decision made at
the Washington conference in 1921 to end the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a
profound error of judgement. Thus one ﬁnds in works by scholars such as Correlli
Barnett, Max Beloﬀ, and A. P. Thornton the premise that this reversal of previous
British policy, which came about largely as the result of American and Canadian
pressure, was strategically ﬂawed and compromised imperial defence throughout
the inter-war period. It helped therefore to lead to the outbreak of the Second
World War and thus contributed indirectly to the dissolution of the empire.3
These historians contend that the termination of the alliance failed on many
levels. In regard to relations with Japan, it is held that by getting rid of an alliance
of twenty years standing Britain turned its back on ‘a useful as well as a loyal ally ’,
and through this unwise policy ‘quite gratuitously, raised up a new danger ’.4
2 For the role of analogies in history, see Beatrice Heuser and Cyril Buﬀet, ‘Conclusions: historical
myths and denial of change’, in Beatrice Heuser and Cyril Buﬀet, eds., Haunted by history : myths in
international relations (Providence, 1998), pp. 259–74.
3 The explicitly critical works are Correlli Barnett, The collapse of British power (London, 1972),
pp. 250–73; Max Beloﬀ, Imperial sunset, Britain’s liberal empire, 1897–1921 (London, 1969), pp. 330–43; and
A. P. Thornton, The imperial idea and its enemies : a study of British power (New York, 1966 edn), pp. 191–5,
but see also the more subtle account in Wm Roger Louis, British strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939
(Oxford, 1971), pp. 50–108. For briefer statements, see Peter Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan,
1933–1934 (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 3–5; Christopher Hall, Britain, America and international arms control
(Basingstoke, 1987), p. 30; John Keay, Last post : the end of empire in the Far East (London, 1997), pp. 147–8;
and C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, The mirage of British power (2 vols., London, 1972), II, p. 303.
4 Barnett, The collapse of British power, pp. 252, 273.
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The result was that in the 1930s, when Britain needed peace in east Asia in order
to concentrate on European events, it found itself ‘confronting a predatory enemy
instead of a loyal friend’.5 The end of the alliance is thus said to have created a
new strategic menace to the empire, vastly complicating the task of imperial
defence. Simultaneously, in terms of relations with the United States, it is argued
that Britain gained little compensation for its act of self-sacriﬁce. At the
Washington conference the treaty that replaced the alliance as the arbiter of
stability in east Asia was the purely consultative four-power pact, involving
Britain, Japan, the United States, and France. In the view of Beloﬀ this
meant that Britain substituted an arrangement based ‘on a nice calculation of
mutual interests and relative capacities ’ for ‘a new system whose function-
ing would principally depend upon the incalculable shifts and whims of the
American democracy’ : Britain had thus placed its trust and the security of its
eastern possessions in a loose multilateral arrangement that had no guarantee
of success.6
In addition it is argued that Britain, by agreeing to sign the ﬁve-power treaty on
naval arms limitation that was also negotiated at Washington, gave up the only
unilateral means it had for controlling Japan – its maritime supremacy. By
agreeing to this pact, which allowed Japan to possess a ﬂeet that was virtually
two-thirds the size of the Royal Navy and debarred Hong Kong from being
turned into a naval base, Britain forfeited regional naval superiority to the
Japanese. The latter therefore became impervious to foreign threats and thus
were encouraged in their expansionary ardour.
From this perspective the death of the alliance appears as a tragic act of
ingratitude brought about by momentary weakness, and taken with little thought
for its portentous consequences. Moreover, implicit in this argument is the
hypothesis that, if the alliance had been maintained, Britain could have used its
inﬂuence to restrain Japan, and that the Manchurian crisis, the Sino-Japanese
War, and the Paciﬁc War need never have come about. It is therefore hardly
surprising that, drawing on this consensus, a recent study of British decoloniz-
ation has gone as far as to declare that the lapsing of the alliance was arguably
‘one of the gravest errors of twentieth-century British diplomacy’.7
Strangely, however, this view is not one that is reﬂected in the most detailed
study of the latter phase of the history of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Ian Nish’s
Alliance in decline.8 Nish argues that the decision made at Washington to allow the
alliance to lapse merely constituted the formal burial of a relationship that had
already died. Its decline, he observes, had been a long drawn out aﬀair, which
5 Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan, p. 3. 6 Beloﬀ, Imperial sunset, p. 343.
7 L. J. Butler, Britain and empire : adjusting to a post-imperial world (London, 2002), p. 24.
8 Ian Nish, Alliance in decline : a study in Anglo-Japanese relations, 1908–1923 (London, 1972), pp. 391–7.
For a recent restatement of his views, see Ian Nish, ‘Echoes of Alliance, 1920–1930’, in Ian Nish and
Yoichi Kibata, eds., The history of Anglo-Japanese relations : the political-diplomatic dimension, 1600–1930
(Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 256–7. See also Phillips Payson O’Brien, ‘Britain and the end of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance’, in Phillips Payson O’Brien, ed., The Anglo-Japanese alliance (London, 2004), p. 268.
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‘had sapped the mutual conﬁdence which must be at the root of any alliance ’.9
He also does not see its termination as leading inevitably to Anglo-Japanese
alienation, arguing instead that ‘ the historian is hard put to it to point out any
striking repercussions on relations between the two countries of the death of the
alliance and its prolonged funeral ’.10 He notes that, if anything, its impact was
‘more symbolic than real ’ and ‘psychological rather than practical ’.11
Furthermore, in putting the decision in context, Nish reminds us that at the time
statesmen from both Britain and Japan ‘rated the eﬀectiveness of the new four-
power treaty more highly than we would be inclined to do with the beneﬁt of
hindsight ’.12 Taking a slightly diﬀerent approach, John Ferris, a leading authority
on British imperial defence, has reinforced this argument by demonstrating that,
while the ending of the alliance was a blow, it is a mistake to see Britain as
emerging emasculated from the Washington conference, for it still retained its
position as the pre-eminent naval power. It was only when it agreed in 1930 to
reduce its stock of cruisers and to prolong the naval building holiday for capital
ships that had been agreed at Washington that its maritime position began to
weaken.13 A recent essay by Erik Goldstein has also helped to put the decision to
terminate the alliance in context. Goldstein stresses the need to understand
British decision-making from a global rather than simply east Asian perspective,
and the importance of looking at British suspicions of France and the subsequent
need to court the United States.14 Why then is there such a gulf between the views
of the generalists and those of the specialists? Why do so many historians see the
termination of the alliance as a selﬁsh and ultimately self-destructive British act,
while Nish and others accept it as a natural parting of the ways?
One explanation for this discrepancy is that those engaged in the broad studies
of British foreign policy have based their interpretation on a number of unsub-
stantiated assumptions. They have, for example, presumed that naval limitation
necessarily meant an end to British maritime predominance and that American
reluctance to co-operate with Britain was no diﬀerent from American hostility.
Most importantly they have assumed that Japan was always a loyal ally to Britain,
and have let hindsight blind them to the fact that towards the end the alliance was
deeply troubled. But why have historians been content to rest their case on these
assumptions? The contention of this article is that, consciously or unconsciously,
they have been inﬂuenced in their writings by a powerful historical myth, which
one can refer to as the ‘ghost ’ of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This ‘ghost ’ is a
sympathetic rather than a frightening spectre. It portrays the alliance as a warm
relationship in which Japan had acted as a loyal and true friend, and suggests
9 Nish, Alliance in decline, p. 392. 10 Ibid., p. 391. 11 Ibid., p. 397. 12 Ibid.
13 John Ferris, ‘ ‘‘ It is our business in the navy to command the seas ’’ : the last decade of British
maritime supremacy, 1919–1929’, in Keith Neilson and Gregory C. Kennedy, eds., Far ﬂung lines : studies
in imperial defence in honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1997), pp. 129–34.
14 Erik Goldstein, ‘The evolution of British diplomatic strategy for the Washington conference’, in
Erik Goldstein and John Maurer, eds., The Washington conference, 1921–1922: naval rivalry, east Asian
stability and the road to Pearl Harbor (London, 1994), pp. 4–34.
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that, if not separated prematurely, the allies would have continued to co-operate
in mutual trust and respect. Thus, having come under the ‘ghost’s ’ inﬂuence,
what the general writers describe is not the reality of the alliance and its termin-
ation, but rather a very persistent spectral distortion. In other words what we
have here is orthodoxy based on a myth.
The prevalence of this received wisdom begs three questions ; when and why
did this ‘ghost ’ ﬁrst appear, and how has it been able to exert its inﬂuence even to
the present day. These are important questions, for it is only by understanding the
origins and nature of the myth that one can begin to disentangle the historical
record from its baleful inﬂuence. This article argues that the ‘ghost ’ ﬁrst mani-
fested itself almost immediately after the alliance’s death. This did not come
about due to mere sentimental nostalgia, but reﬂected the fact that criticism of the
alliance’s demise became a cause ce´le`bre of the right in British politics, which
believed that the relationship with Japan had been sacriﬁced in the name of
internationalism. Praise for the alliance was therefore implicitly a rejection of the
tenets of post-war diplomacy and a call for a return to a foreign policy based
on the balance of power and national interest. To argue this case eﬀectively,
however, it was necessary to mythologize the alliance and turn it into an exemplar
of the certainties of ‘old diplomacy’. The ‘ghost ’ is therefore an obstacle to our
understanding of why the alliance was terminated, but at the same time, like
other political myths, it tells us much about the period in which its presence was
ﬁrst felt.
I I
The best place to begin such a study is brieﬂy to provide an interpretation based
on the specialist literature of why and how the alliance ended in 1921–2. The
starting point is that the alliance had been renewed in 1911 for ten years : the
British and Japanese governments therefore had to decide in 1921 whether they
wanted to continue with this treaty relationship. This issue was very delicate for
Britain, for it was clear that the United States was suspicious of Japanese am-
bitions in Asia and felt that Japan was using the alliance as a shield under whose
protection it could infringe the ‘open door ’ in China. American opposition was
something that could not be ignored, for the British government of David Lloyd
George wished to build up a spirit of co-operation with Washington, a policy that
was also strongly supported by the Meighen administration in Canada and that of
Smuts in South Africa. Thus in the run-up to the Washington conference con-
siderable pressure was exerted on Britain to terminate the alliance.15
It is important to note though that Britain had its own reasons for doubting the
wisdom of continuing the alliance. Japan had entered the Great War in August
1914 on Britain’s side, but its behaviour during the conﬂict had not on the whole
15 Ira Klein, ‘Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 1919–1921’, Paciﬁc Historical
Review, 41 (1972), pp. 460–83; and Nish, Alliance in decline, pp. 324–53.
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endeared it to its ally. On the positive side Japan had protected the sea-lanes to
Australia and New Zealand and allocated destroyers for duty in the
Mediterranean. On the other hand, however, it always insisted on a high price for
this support, and on a number of occasions abruptly turned down requests for
further assistance. This was understandable to a degree, as the alliance did not
commit it to come to Britain’s aid outside east Asia, but, when added to the way
in which Japan’s media argued that it had entered the conﬂict on the wrong side,
it created a poor impression. Furthermore, its adventurism in China and Siberia,
the rise of pan-Asian sentiment, its refusal to hand over a number of Indian
revolutionaries, and the presence of Japanese propagandists in Malaya and India
engendered suspicion of its long-term objectives.16
The result of this war record was that the senior oﬃcials involved in the day-to-
day diplomacy towards east Asia, such as the past and present ministers to Peking,
Sir John Jordan and Sir Beilby Alston, the former ambassador to Tokyo,
Sir William Conyngham Greene, and the supervisor of the Far Eastern
Department, Sir Victor Wellesley, who were all too aware of Japan’s machi-
nations, were opposed to the alliance’s renewal.17 This opposition was reinforced
by the fact that, with the defeat of Germany and the collapse of Russia into civil
strife, the alliance had in any case lost its raison d’eˆtre. Indeed, the irony of the
situation was that only one power now posed a potential threat to British interests
in east Asia, and that was Japan itself.
On the other hand, for some, including Lloyd George, the potential Japanese
threat constituted a reason in itself to continue the alliance, as the best way to
control Japan’s ambitions was to keep it close. Only this, it was held, would stop it
from drifting into a future alignment with Germany and Russia.18 Thus the
foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, observed at a committee of imperial defence
(CID) meeting in December 1920 that the alliance with the ‘ insidious and
unscrupulous ’ Japanese was necessary to keep them in order.19 This view was also
strongly supported by William Hughes, the prime minister of Australia, who
emerged somewhat surprisingly, considering the anti-Japanese line he had taken
at Paris in 1919, as the most ardent proponent for continuing the alliance.
Hughes, however, had his reasons ; he too was concerned for his country’s
security, but as well as that he also saw renewal of the alliance as a means of
forcing Japan to respect Australia’s ‘white-only ’ immigration laws.20
16 Peter Lowe, Britain and Japan, 1911–1915: a study of British Far Eastern policy (London, 1969) ;
R. J. Popplewell, Intelligence and imperial defence : British intelligence and the defence of the Indian empire,
1904–1924 (London, 1995) ch. 11 ; Antony Best, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia,
1914–1941 (Basingstoke, 2002) ch. 3; and Nish, Alliance in decline, pp. 115–262.
17 See, for example, CID130-C, ‘Suggestions for an Anglo-Saxon policy in the Far East ’, Alston
memorandum, 1 Aug. 1920, London, National Archives (NA) CAB5/3.
18 See John Ferris, ‘Armaments and allies : the Anglo-Japanese strategic relationship, 1911–1921’, in
O’Brien, ed., The Anglo-Japanese alliance, pp. 254–7.
19 CID 134th meeting, 14 Dec. 1920, NA CAB2/3.
20 Sean Brawley, The white peril : foreign relations and Asian immigration to Australasia and North America,
1919–1978 (Sydney, 1995), pp. 73–4.
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From the meeting of these two competing views of the alliance there eventually
arose a mutually acceptable compromise, namely that the simple answer to
American and Canadian criticism was that the treaty should be expanded to
include the United States. Accordingly, at the Imperial Conference in London in
the summer of 1921 the delegates agreed that this should become the objective for
Britain to pursue at the forthcoming gathering in Washington. However, when
the Washington conference opened in November 1921 the American secretary of
state, Charles Evan Hughes, summarily rejected any such arrangement.21
By this time events had proceeded to such a point that it was unthinkable that
Britain could return to straightforward renewal. This was because at Washington
the future of the alliance became inexorably linked to the issue of naval arms
limitation. By 1921 the naval arms race that had developed between the United
States and Japan had led the Admiralty to call for the construction of new capital
ships, lest Britain be left behind. This was an expenditure that the Treasury could
ill aﬀord and which had the potential to spark an Anglo-American naval com-
petition that the British were unlikely to win. As a result Britain realized that the
only way in which it could avoid involvement in an arms race was if it agreed to
forego the alliance and thus create an environment in which the United States
would agree to naval limitation. This was not an unattractive proposition, for
what was on oﬀer at Washington was a deal that in theory oﬀered Anglo-
American parity, but in reality allowed Britain to maintain a slight quantitative
and qualitative advantage over the United States, and a two-power standard in
relation to Japan and France.22
It can therefore be argued that Britain accepted non-renewal largely because
the reasons for maintaining the alliance were not substantial enough to warrant
jeopardizing American goodwill, and because the strategic disadvantages arising
from termination were compensated for by the introduction of naval arms limi-
tation. Thus in analysing the story of the death of the alliance one cannot say that
Britain was enthusiastic about continuing its ties with Japan but was cruelly de-
nied by circumstance from attaining this goal. In fact it only desired to keep its
link with Tokyo for the purpose of controlling this otherwise potentially danger-
ous rival, which it had little reason to trust. However, once it became clear that
this expedient policy would damage imperial unity, impair relations with
Washington and possibly lead to a naval arms race, the sacriﬁcing of Japan
was inevitable. To argue from hindsight that the end of the alliance was simply
dictated by Washington and Ottawa, or that it was merely a naive decision
inﬂuenced by a nebulous desire to construct an Anglo-American world order, is
therefore to miss the point. This was not a rash move by the British government,
but one that squarely met the strategic and ﬁnancial circumstances that faced
Whitehall in the autumn of 1921.
21 Nish, Alliance in decline, pp. 368–71.
22 See Ferris, ‘ ‘‘ It is our business in the navy to command the seas’’ ’, pp. 129–34.
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Contrary to some accounts, opinion in parliament and the media broadly
agreed to the severing of the alliance with Japan and saw the Washington con-
ference as an unmitigated success.23 In the House of Commons, there was no
debate on the issue of the alliance’s future, but on the eve of the gathering
in Washington a unanimous resolution was passed supporting the conference’s
objectives.24 Furthermore the tone of parliamentary questions concerning Japan
was generally critical. For example, MPs from the coalition benches often
expressed concerns about Japan’s activities in China, while Labour members
lobbied the government to press for a Japanese withdrawal from eastern Siberia.
In the media many voices, including those of the Manchester Guardian and The
Spectator, argued that military pacts had no place in an international order now
deﬁned by the League of Nations and that the alliance should be abrogated in
order to draw closer to Washington.25 Moreover a notable symbol of Britain’s
changing attitude towards Japan was that The Times, which had been one of the
original advocates of an alliance at the turn of the century, now took a strongly
anti-Japanese stance.26
It was not merely internationalism and the desire for Anglo-American soli-
darity that led the media in this direction, for a number of journalists were in-
ﬂuenced by suspicion of Japan and its war record. For example, Henry Wickham
Steed, the editor of The Times, noted in September 1921 his belief that Japanese
ambitions in Asia were ‘ incompatible with British interests either in the Far East
or in Asia generally ’.27 Meanwhile, the veteran military correspondent, Charles a`
Court Repington, recorded in his diary that ‘ Japan seems to me to have con-
stantly infringed both the letter and the spirit of her alliance with England, and
has been openly aiming at the protectorship of China. ’28 Thus one can conclude
that if the government had decided to retain the alliance at the cost of American
friendship it would have been running against the broad tide of public opinion.
In the years immediately following the Washington conference, anti-Japanese
sentiment continued to be expressed. In 1923 the British ambassador to Tokyo,
Sir Charles Eliot, observed, while on home leave, that among the politically well-
informed the popularity of Japan had much declined since his previous visit three
years before.29 Much of this distaste can be attributed to the claims made at this
23 The claim that the decision was taken in the face of public opinion is in Peter Calvocoressi, Guy
Wint, and R. John Pritchard, Total war : the causes and course of the Second World War (2 vols., London,
1989), II, p. 47. For a more accurate account, see Inbal Rose, Conservatism and foreign policy during the Lloyd
George coalition, 1918–1922 (London, 1999), pp. 170–1.
24 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 147, cc. 2093–145 (4 Nov. 1921).
25 Charles Nelson Spinks, ‘The termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’, Paciﬁc Historical Review,
6 (1937), pp. 321–40, at p. 327.
26 The history of The Times : the 150th anniversary and beyond, 1912–1948 (2 vols., London, 1952), II,
pp. 612–22.
27 ‘British policy in the Paciﬁc’, Steed memorandum, 22 Sept. 1921, London, British Library, Steed
papers, Add. MSS 74156, fo. 187.
28 C. A`. Court Repington, After the war : a diary (London, 1922), p. 399.
29 Eliot to Vansittart, 3 July 1923, NA Curzon papers FO800/155.
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time by the Admiralty that Japan posed a potentially serious threat to British
interests. To a substantial degree the Admiralty’s ﬁxation with Japan after 1922
arose from its own budgetary considerations, but in order to strengthen its case
the propaganda it directed at the cabinet made biting references to Japanese
wartime behaviour.30 Thus, in 1924 the ﬁrst sea lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Beatty, warned the government that ‘The behaviour of Japan during the late war
should not be forgotten’ and that it could not be trusted in the future.31 In March
1925 Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes followed suit, noting that if the Japanese,
who were engaged in ‘a steady and ruthless preparation for war’, were not
checked they would ‘ turn Europeans out of China and, in time, Asia ’.32
The naval lobby in the House of Commons also voiced hostility. Between 1922
and 1925 the debates on naval estimates, and in particular those concerned
with the construction of a naval base at Singapore, witnessed a number of
Conservative MPs openly criticizing Japan. For example, Sir Frederick Penny,
the MP for Kingston-upon-Thames, warned in March 1924 that the Japanese
had the same mentality as the Germans, while in March 1925 Carlyon Bellairs,
the MP for Maidstone, drew parallels between Japan’s naval expansion and the
Anglo-German arms race before 1914.33
The government, as one might expect, studiously avoided such heated rhetoric.
Indeed, they went in the opposite direction. In order to reassure Japan about
Singapore, ministers strenuously denied that the base was being built because of
suspicion of that country. To reinforce this argument they began to make senti-
mental references to the alliance and to laud, in the words of the prime minister,
Stanley Baldwin, the ‘ special bond of an historic and valued relationship’.34
Thus, when the naval estimates for 1925 came up for debate in parliament, both
the Lord President of the Council, Lord Balfour, in the Lords, and the First Lord
of the Admiralty, Sir William Bridgeman, in the Commons, referred to the long
history of British friendship with Japan.35 The alliance therefore became an
oﬃcial object of nostalgia. Ironically, at the same time a similar interpretation of
the past was used by opponents of the Singapore base who contended that its
construction wantonly risked alienating Britain’s formerly ‘scrupulously loyal ’
ally.36 Thus in one of the debates Lloyd George paid testimony to Japan’s assist-
ance during the Great War, noting ‘she was one of our best Allies ; she kept her
bargain very faithfully with us ; she held those seas for us ; she protected our
30 On naval policy and Japan in the early 1920s see Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, seapower and
strategy between the wars (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 18–19.
31 ‘Consequences of suspending work at Singapore’, Beatty note, 28 Apr. 1924, in B. M. Ranft, ed.,
The Beatty papers : selections from the private and oﬃcial correspondence and papers of Admiral of the Fleet Beatty
(Aldershot, 1993), p. 395.
32 Keyes to Churchill, 21 Mar. 1925, in Martin Gilbert, ed., Winston S. Churchill, V, Companion, part I
(London, 1979), p. 443.
33 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 171, c. 1226 (25 Mar. 1924), and vol. 181, c. 2625
(19 Mar. 1925). 34 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 180, c. 1590 (23 Feb. 1925).
35 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Lords), vol. 60, c. 386 (4 Mar. 1925), and (Commons), vol. 181,
c. 2525 (19 Mar. 1925). 36 ‘The Singapore base’, Spectator, 28 Mar. 1925, p. 488.
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commerce … when we wanted our ships at home’.37 Both of these eﬀorts to
sentimentalize were political manoeuvres and did not mean that these ﬁgures
actually questioned the decision to end the alliance. However, by asserting
a benevolent interpretation of the alliance’s history, they began to create
an environment in which that case could be made.
I I I
One of the few commentators on foreign aﬀairs who openly criticized the decision
to terminate the alliance was Leo Maxse, the editor of the monthly journal, the
National Review. In a number of editorial essays from 1922 onwards, Maxse and
other contributors to the journal savagely lambasted the Lloyd George govern-
ment for its gross incompetence in allowing the alliance to collapse. In these
attacks they consistently noted the stability that had existed under the alliance and
paid tribute to Japan’s resolute friendship. For example, in February 1925 Maxse
observed in typically biting prose that :
Great Britain had always found the Japanese a singularly loyal ally, and the splendid
service they rendered the cause of civilization by coming into the Great War on our
side should have spared them the humiliation which the emasculates of Downing Street
allowed the Washington Government to inﬂict upon them.38
It was therefore Maxse and his acolytes who ﬁrst began to cultivate the idea that
the alliance had been some kind of golden age which Britain had foolishly turned
its back upon.
In order to place this attack on British policy in context it is important to note
that, ﬁrst, Maxse was a long-standing admirer of the Japanese and, second, that
the National Review was no ordinary journal, but was, along with the Morning Post,
one of the splenetic mouthpieces of the ‘die-hard’ wing of the Conservative party.
The assault on the abrogation of the alliance therefore needs to be seen in the
light of the ‘die-hard ’ faction’s extreme hostility to many of the ideas that inﬂu-
enced British thinking on foreign policy in the 1920s. Wedded to the Hobbesian
idea that international politics was deﬁned by an unrelenting competition be-
tween states for power, the ‘die-hards ’ dismissed the League of Nations as an
idealistic, liberal pipe dream that was doomed to failure and also raged against
the concepts of naval limitation and disarmament. Indeed, they even went as
far as viewing internationalism as a pernicious collectivist creed that was the
antithesis of British patriotism and which, if unchallenged, had the potential to
37 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 186, c. 1663 (16 July 1925). See also the comment
by the Labour politician Commander Kenworthy in Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons),
vol. 193, c. 960 (22 Mar. 1926).
38 ‘Episodes of the Month’, National Review, 84 (Feb. 1925), p. 822. Maxse’s attacks began in the May
1922 edition. For other commentators see ‘Centurion’, ‘A ﬁrst-class blunder and its results ’, National
Review, 85 (May 1925), pp. 382–96, and ‘Diplomaticus’, ‘The choice’, National Review, 85 (Aug. 1925),
pp. 902–10.
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sap the nation’s spiritual strength. For them Britain’s national interests could only
be defended by a ‘realistic ’ policy of imperial isolation based on strong arma-
ments.39 In addition, they had little time for the ‘Atlanticism’ that permeated
liberal thought in Britain. For the ‘die-hards ’ the United States was an unreliable
power and one that posed, due to its ﬁnancial and economic strength, a potent
threat to the future of the empire. Nothing symbolized this better than the
on-going debate about Britain’s war debts, which showed to the right of the
Conservative party the liberal folly of assuming that the Americans would look
benevolently on their English cousins.40
Maxse himself epitomized die-hard views. He had, for example, once rejected
an oﬀer of membership of the English Speaking Union on the grounds that he
would have no truck with ‘all this Anglo-American ‘‘ slobber’’ ’.41 His praise of the
alliance was thus implicitly not merely an attack on a single misguided decision,
but rather part of a general criticism of modern practice and a plea to return to
the certainties of the pre-war era. Therefore from the very start the debate about
the alliance’s termination contained an ideological element.
At ﬁrst only a few observers supported Maxse’s view that Britain had erred in
scrapping the alliance, but slowly the chorus of criticism began to grow. The ﬁrst
major event that brought about a wider reassessment of the alliance’s demise was
the seizure by the Chinese nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), of the
British concession at Hankow in central China in January 1927. To some con-
servatives this humiliation, which came after two years of Chinese provocation,
displayed all too clearly what Britain had lost by sacriﬁcing the alliance in 1921–2.
As one observer, Captain Bertram Ramsay, noted in April 1927 ‘ there is no doubt
whatever that it [the alliance] would have made all the diﬀerence in the present
disturbance & might conceivably have prevented it ’.42 Thus, this event led con-
servatives to lament the loss of an alliance that, they contended, had guaranteed
regional stability ; a basic matter of strategy that Britain had foolishly neglected
in 1921.
Further reinforcing this tendency was the fact that by 1927 a number of prob-
lems had come to dog Anglo-American relations. In regard to east Asia it was felt
that, although the alliance had been sacriﬁced for the beaux yeux of the Americans,
little had been gained by such a manoeuvre, for the United States had not
once come to Britain’s aid in China. The most controversial area of dispute,
however, was over naval policy. Here two linked issues, Washington’s calls for
a redeﬁnition of the freedom of the seas and its demand for parity in cruiser
numbers, threatened the Royal Navy’s global predominance. Accordingly, the
39 See G. C. Webber, The ideology of the British right, 1918–1939 (London, 1986), pp. 116–17; Markku
Ruotsila, British and American anticommunism before the cold war (London, 2001), pp. 71–4 and 142–52; and
Rose, Conservatism and foreign policy, pp. 56–9. 40 Rose, Conservatism and foreign policy, pp. 107–27.
41 Maxse to Wrench, 22 July 1919, Chichester, West Sussex Record Oﬃce (WSRO), Maxse papers,
476, fo. 57.
42 Ramsey to Keyes, 9 Apr. 1927, in Paul G. Halpern, ed., The Keyes papers : selections from the private and
oﬃcial correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of Zeebrugge (2 vols., Aldershot, 1980), II, p. 211.
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Geneva naval arms limitation conference in the summer of 1927 was a bad-
tempered aﬀair in which, to British eyes, American bellicosity contrasted with the
goodwill of the Japanese delegation.43
The newly found sympathy for the alliance went, however, beyond strategic
considerations, for also underlying this reappraisal was an assumption that Britain
and Japan stood for similar values and approaches to international politics. In
order to understand this thinking one has ﬁrst to grasp that the Chinese policy
pursued by the Conservative foreign secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain in 1926–7
was deeply unpopular with many in his party.44 Chamberlain’s diplomacy was
based upon the idea that Chinese nationalism was a phenomenon that could not
be suppressed through the use of force. As such, the best way to protect British
interests was to show a willingness to negotiate away the trappings of imperial
privilege and to move towards a more equal relationship. This policy appealed to
liberals, but to the ‘die-hards ’ it smacked of weakness ; to them it proved, as one
individual noted succinctly, that Chamberlain ‘has no guts ’.45 The prevailing
view on the Conservative benches in parliament was that the pretensions of
Chinese nationalism were illegitimate ; Britain, after all, had acquired its privi-
leges in China as treaty rights. Moreover, China’s recent history, in which it
had been torn asunder by civil war and plagued by bad governance and labour
agitation, hardly suggested that the sacriﬁce of British treaty rights would
guarantee future prosperity. Then there was, of course, the most damning
indictment of all, which was that the KMT in its campaign to reunify China had
turned for support to the entity that the Conservative party loathed above all
others – the Soviet Union.
This disdain for revolutionary China led conservatives to contrast it with
Japan, which stood as the antithesis of Chinese disorder. As a country that had a
constitutional monarchy and which put great stress on property, tradition, and
the upholding of law and order, Japan possessed values that British conservatives
could understand. It also, as the Conservative MP for Norwich, Edward Hilton
Young, observed in the House of Commons in February 1927, beneﬁted from
good leadership, a concept alien to China – ‘the worst governed country in the
world’.46 In addition, Japan respected international treaties, shared the con-
servative antipathy towards communism, and was itself a victim of China’s call
for the end of foreign privileges. Furthermore, in contrast to Chamberlain’s line,
Japan was represented as standing ﬁrm in deﬁance of Chinese nationalism and
43 See B. J. C. McKercher, The second Baldwin government and the United States, 1924–1929: attitudes and
diplomacy (Cambridge, 1984), ch. 3.
44 See, for example, Amery to Baldwin, 18 Sept. 1926, Cambridge University Library (CUL),
Baldwin papers, vol. 115. For commentators in the right-wing media see J. O. P. Bland, ‘Plain truths
about China’, English Review, 44 (Feb. 1927), pp. 145–54; and Ernest Remnant, ‘Conciliation or
capitulation?’, English Review, 44 (Apr. 1927), pp. 392–400.
45 King to Maxse, 7 Sept. 1926, WSRO, Maxse papers, 479, fo. 484.
46 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 202, c. 341 (10 Feb. 1927).
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as insisting that treaty rights be respected.47 This was, of course, a self-serving
interpretation of Japan’s China policy, for its diplomacy was considerably more
complex than this, but it was a convenient image to hold when the object was to
criticize Britain’s supposedly supine Foreign Oﬃce.48
Contemporary events thus appeared, as far as the right was concerned, to
conﬁrm that much had been lost when the alliance had been terminated. Britain
had forsaken a like-minded ally only to ﬁnd itself isolated in a sea of adversity. In
this environment the criticism of Japan that had been evident on the right in the
immediate wake of the Washington conference was forgotten. Now it was
Maxse’s interpretation of the alliance that attracted attention, for it presented a
romantic image of the once stable world that had existed before the storm.
Inﬂuenced by such thinking, a few Conservative MPs, including former critics
from the naval lobby, went beyond wallowing in nostalgia and began to call
openly for a rapprochement with Japan, with whom, as one put it, Britain had
‘had the happiest alliance for many years ’.49 Some government oﬃcials expressed
similar sentiments. For example, in February 1930 a memorandum by the
governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi, warning of Japan’s ambitions in
China, led the director of naval intelligence to note forlornly that this was ‘ sad
reading for one who regrets the surrender of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mainly
in deference to American susceptibilities with the resultant decrease in security in
the Far East, and what gained?’.50
I V
If the ‘northern expedition ’ sowed the seeds of the conservative reassessment of
the alliance, then the troubled course of the Manchurian crisis of 1931–3 was the
catalyst that caused it to come into full bloom.51 From the very start of this new
period of turbulence the ‘die-hards ’ took a pro-Japanese stance, claiming, for
example, that its aggression within southern Manchuria constituted a legitimate
act of self-defence in the face of constant provocation.52 These statements of
support were a natural evolution of the views expressed in 1927–8, but what was
diﬀerent about this crisis, and led them to be even more fervent, was that on this
occasion the League of Nations was involved. By appealing to Geneva to mediate
47 ‘Current comments ’, English Review, 44 (Mar. 1927), pp. 263–5.
48 See, for example, Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–1931 (Basingstoke,
1995).
49 Looker (C-Essex SE) speech in Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 211, c. 2356 (14 Dec.
1927). See also the speech by Bellairs (C-Maidstone) in vol. 210, c. 2174 (24 Nov. 1927), and the PQ
asked by Howard-Bury (C-Chelmsford) in vol. 211, c. 1836 (12 Dec. 1927).
50 DNI minute, 18 Feb. 1930, NA ADM1/8744/128.
51 For the international diplomacy of the Manchurian crisis see Christopher Thorne, The limits of
foreign policy : the West, the League and the Far Eastern crisis of 1931–1933 (London, 1972) ; and Ian Nish, Japan’s
struggle with internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–1933 (London, 1993).
52 See, for example, Bland to Editor, The Times, 19 Oct. 1931, p. 8, col. C; and ‘Orient’, ‘Practical
politics in the far east ’, Empire Review (Apr. 1932), p. 212.
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the crisis in September 1931, China raised the dispute on to an entirely diﬀerent
level, for suddenly a successful solution to the problems in Manchuria became a
measure of whether the League would be able to live up to the hopes that it had
engendered.
The involvement of Geneva heightened support for Japan in ‘die-hard’ circles,
for they had never been sympathetic towards the League, seeing it as the ill-
starred creation of that naive utopian President Wilson. Moreover, this antipathy
towards the League was, of course, reinforced by the fact that the Labour party
and the detested progressive intellectuals so resolutely put their faith in the idea
of collective security. Indeed there existed at the time a stiﬂing intellectual
climate, particularly in parliament itself, in which criticism of the League was seen
as heresy.53 Accordingly the crisis represented a chance for the ‘die-hards ’ to
demonstrate what they saw as the absurdity of diplomacy centred on the League
rather than national interest, particularly once the internationalists began to call
for sanctions against Japan.
The result was that from 1931 onwards a growing number of Conservative MPs
sought both publicly and privately to defend Japan’s actions, and, moreover, to
argue that the crisis would never have happened if the alliance had been allowed
to continue. Indeed it is at this point that one might say that this view became an
established item of conservative dogma, for even those not normally associated
with the ‘die-hards ’, including ﬁgures such as R. A. Butler and Cuthbert
Headlam, now began to repeat it as received wisdom.54 Lamentations for the lost
days of the alliance and calls for friendship with Japan were now expressed fairly
frequently in debates in both houses of parliament.55 Thus, in May 1934, none
other than Admiral Keyes, now the newly elected Conservative MP for
Portsmouth North, observed that the present unsatisfactory conditions had their
roots in the recent past when Britain had made the ‘deplorable mistake’ of ter-
minating its alliance with Japan. This was a decision, Keyes claimed dis-
ingenuously, that he had always regretted, for Japan had listened to Britain when
the alliance had existed. He ended his peroration by recommending to those in
government that they should do ‘all in their power to return to the excellent
understanding with Japan which existed in those days ’.56 His colleague Victor
Cazalet, the Conservative MP for Chippenham, enthusiastically agreed, noting
that ‘ in the Great War Japan had shown herself as a very loyal ally of this
country ’ and aﬃrming that Britain should accept its dominant role in east Asia.57
53 See R. Bassett, Democracy and foreign policy : a case history (London, 1952), p. 569.
54 Butler to Brabourne, 12 Dec. 1935, London, British Library, Asian, Paciﬁc, and African Dept,
Brabourne papers, MSS.Eur.F97/20A; and diary entry, 8 Mar. 1936, Durham, County Durham
Record Oﬃce, Headlam papers, D/He 32.
55 For such comments, see Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 275, c. 2220 (16 Mar.
1933) ; and Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Lords), vol. 97, cc. 527–42 (3 Apr. 1935), and vol. 102, cc. 22–6
(20 July 1936). 56 Parliamentary debates, 5th series (Commons), vol. 289, c. 2084 (18 May 1934).
57 Ibid., c. 2085.
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These views were also echoed in the media, where one of the new adherents to
this line was Viscount Rothermere. In editorials in the Daily Mail and in speeches
made during a visit to Japan in 1936 he deplored the alliance’s termination and
lambasted the League enthusiasts whom he saw as poisoning relations with the
Japanese.58 In addition, the Empire Review, the English Review, the Morning Post, the
Saturday Review, and the National Review produced a series of articles that lamented
past errors and called for renewed friendship. For example, in April 1933 Sir
Clement Kinloch-Cooke, the editor of the Empire Review, observed in his monthly
column that
After much harassing of mind and not a little sympathetic feeling, people are beginning to
recall the beneﬁts of the alliance and the generous and unceasing aid given by Japan to this
country during the Great War. They are thinking more of what the alliance stood for than
of the tricky ways of Geneva, where a great deal is talked about but comparatively little
achieved.59
In a similar vein another passionate plea for better Anglo-Japanese relations,
which was published anonymously in November 1933 in the English Review, in-
cluded the remarkable assertion that in 1914 ‘ the Japanese were absolutely the
only people we could depend upon’.60 A number of studies of contemporary east
Asia also included similar arguments, most notably those by Malcolm Kennedy, a
former Reuters correspondent in Japan, and Ernest Pickering, a former
Conservative MP.61
The allusions to the ‘golden age’ of the alliance were not restricted to the
political foot soldiers, for those in the highest reaches of power also expressed such
sentiments. For example, in September 1933 the chief of the imperial general
staﬀ, General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, declared that the de-
cision to end the alliance had been one of ‘ insensate folly ’ which had deprived
Britain ‘of a valued ally for no compensating gain in the shape of a less jealous
America’.62 Another signiﬁcant critic was the chancellor of the exchequer, Neville
Chamberlain, who observed at a meeting of the CID in November 1933 that he
considered the abrogation of the alliance to have been a mistake as ‘ it had
gradually poisoned our relations with Japan’.63 Accordingly he proposed that
58 Viscount Rothermere, Warnings and predictions (London, 1939), pp. 180–5, and Spinks, ‘The
termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’, p. 321.
59 The Editor, ‘Round the empire’, Empire Review (Apr. 1933), p. 195.
60 ‘R’, ‘Anglo-Japanese relations’, English Review, 57 (Nov. 1933), pp. 519–25. See also the comments
by George Sale in the ‘Summary of discussion’ appendix to Lord Lothian, ‘The crisis in the Paciﬁc’,
International Aﬀairs, 14 (Mar.–Apr. 1935), pp. 170–1.
61 Malcolm Kennedy, The problem of Japan (London, 1935), pp. 64–74; and Ernest H. Pickering,
Japan’s place in the modern world (London, 1936), pp. 318–19. For a review of this literature, see
Jon Pardoe, ‘British writing on contemporary Japan, 1924–1941: newspapers, books, reviews and
propaganda’, in Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki, eds., The history of Anglo-Japanese relations,
V: The social and cultural perspectives, 1600–2000 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 281–304.
62 Montgomery-Massingberd (CIGS) to Hankey (Cabinet Oﬃce), 11 Sept. 1933, NA CAB21/369.
63 CID 261st meeting, 9 Nov. 1933, NA CAB2/6.
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Britain should attempt to restore its former friendship with Japan, a line that he
was intermittently to pursue with a marked lack of success for the rest of the
decade.
The belief that abrogation of the alliance had been a calamitous mistake thus
rapidly gathered converts and led a sizeable minority to argue that, if Britain
revoked its obeisance to Washington and Geneva, a new relationship could be
built with Japan that would guarantee the security of British interests in the east.
But while this argument was frequently voiced by the right and had some support
within the government, it did not become nearly as inﬂuential as the calls for
appeasement of Germany. In part one can attribute this to circumstance, for the
Japanese threat was clearly not as immediate as that posed by Hitler. In addition,
however, it is important to see that much of the debate about Japan consisted of
mere rhetorical point-scoring rather than mapping out a real alternative policy.
Indeed, reading the statements of those who decried the alliance’s demise one is
struck by the fact that their words of enthusiasm for Japan were not so much for
the country itself, but for what it represented. At heart their arguments were
expressions of hostility towards China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and,
perhaps most of all, the League. Thus Japan was not appreciated for what it
was so much as for what it was not. As such the sympathy for Japan was not deep
and genuine, but rather a symbolic expression of dissatisfaction at the way in
which international politics had evolved since the end of the Great War. It is
therefore no accident that the vague talk of reviving the alliance failed to turn
into anything more substantial, for real pro-Japanese sentiments existed only
among a few.
While the lamentations over the alliance’s demise undoubtedly had popular
appeal, it is also important to note that this view never possessed a monopoly over
British opinion, and that many saw it as a ﬂawed argument. Criticism came from
a number of angles. Some, such as Sir Austen Chamberlain and the cabinet
secretary Sir Maurice Hankey, took a realpolitik line. They agreed that the al-
liance’s demise was regrettable, but from their own experience stated that it was
inconceivable that Britain could have resisted American and Dominion pressure
in 1921–2.64 Others rejected the sentimental images of Japan because the latter’s
aggressive trade policy in the early to mid-1930s directly threatened their liveli-
hood. Thus in areas such as Lancashire conservative opinion began to be at-
tracted more by ‘yellow peril ’ rhetoric than by stories about the special ties that
existed between the ‘ two island empires ’.65
The most biting criticism, however, came from liberal publicists, who directly
attacked the idea that termination had been an error because Japan had proved
64 See Austen Chamberlain to Howard, 25 Apr. 1927, Birmingham University Library, Austen
Chamberlain papers, AC54/264; and Hankey to Montgomery-Massingberd, 22 Sept. 1933, and
Hankey to Neville Chamberlain, 30 Oct. 1933, NA CAB21/369.
65 Antony Best, ‘Economic appeasement or economic nationalism?: a political perspective on the
British empire, Japan and the rise of intra-Asian trade, 1933–1937’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 30 (2002), pp. 77–101.
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itself to be a trustworthy ally in the Great War. In April 1932 Wickham Steed
argued in the journal Nineteenth Century and After that the alliance had been re-
moved for the very good reason that Japan could not be trusted, and described in
detail the suspicion of Japanese activities that he had discovered in British
Columbia in 1921.66 The military correspondent of The Times, Basil Liddell Hart,
took a similar view. In March 1935, in a conversation with Major-General
John Dill, he refuted the latter’s assertion that Japan had been a ‘good ally
to us in the last war ’ asserting that ‘as an ally she wanted to get but not to
give ’.67 Unsurprisingly, the pro-American lobby in British politics also rose to
the challenge. In the autumn of 1934 Lord Lothian helped to organize a
campaign of public speeches and newspaper articles that refuted the claim that
Britain’s destiny lay in renewed friendship with Japan. Among his supporters
were ﬁgures such as J. L. Garvin and Lord Astor, the editor and proprietor of
The Observer, respectively, and General Smuts, who was on a brief visit to
London.68
Behind the scenes many in the Foreign Oﬃce took the same line. In 1926 Sir
Victor Wellesley was recorded as stating that the Japanese were ‘basically un-
trustworthy and unscrupulous ’ and that ‘If one had nothing else to go by, their
attitude towards us during the War would be enough. ’69 The minister in Peking,
Sir Miles Lampson, who had been present at the Washington conference, took
the same line, noting in typically blunt style that ‘The people who killed the A-J
Alliance were primarily the Japanese themselves ’, due to ‘ their misdeeds in
China’ during the Great War.70 In 1934 Sir John Pratt of the Far Eastern
Department aﬃrmed his belief that proposals for a return to the alliance were
‘counsels of sentiment and not of wisdom’, and observed that Japan’s behaviour
during the alliance had meant that the relationship had become ‘a source
of embarrassment ’ to Britain.71 The Foreign Oﬃce thus acted as a strong
institutional check to the idea that the alliance could be revived. Others in
Whitehall expressed similar scepticism. When faced in 1930 with Clementi’s
plea for better relations with Japan, one anonymous member of the War Oﬃce
noted:
When all the past history of the Alliance is reviewed, can it be seriously supposed that
Japan will act in a diﬀerent manner in the future? On the contrary, if it teaches anything,
one is forced to the conclusion that she will use an Entente to increase her own prestige, to
66 Wickham Steed, ‘British policy in the Paciﬁc’, Nineteenth Century and After, 111 (Apr. 1932),
pp. 396–409.
67 ‘Talk with Dill ’, Liddell Hart note, 27 Mar. 1935, London, King’s College, Liddell Hart Centre
for Military Archives, Liddell Hart papers, ﬁle 11/1935 part 1/69.
68 See the speech by General Smuts reported in the Times, 13 Nov. 1934, p. 15, col. F, and Lord
Lothian, ‘The crisis in the Paciﬁc’, International Aﬀairs, 14 (Mar.–Apr. 1935), pp. 170–1.
69 Casey (London) to Bruce, 15 Apr. 1926, in W. J. Hudson and Jane North, eds., My dear P.M.:
R. G. Casey’s letters to S. M. Bruce, 1924–1929 (Canberra, 1980), p. 175.
70 Lampson (Peking) minute, 14 Apr. 1927, NA FO228/3405.
71 CP77(34) ‘Situation in the Far East, 1933–1934’, Simon note, 15 Mar. 1934, NA CAB24/248.
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obtain facilities that would otherwise be denied her; but when we in our turn ask for her to
carry out the spirit of the Entente and render us assistance it will not be forthcoming.72
This was a telling dismissal, for it not only refuted the drift towards nostalgia, but
also pointed to the potential dangers inherent in a sentimental reading of the past.
It is also notable that the ﬁrst serious attempts to write the history of recent
events in east Asia paid little heed to the argument espoused by the right. In 1937
G. F. Hudson noted in his book, The Far East in world politics, that the alliance had
lost its raison d’eˆtre with the defeat of Germany and had thus been ‘practically
inoperative since 1918’.73 Its termination in 1921 was therefore only a simple
recognition of the reality of the situation. Moreover, he observed that the prob-
lem that beset the Washington treaties was not that they had been ﬂawed from
the outset, but rather that they had been overtaken by events, namely the rise
of nationalist China.74 G. E. Hubbard, the expert on east Asian aﬀairs at
Chatham House, took a similar view, observing in his study of contemporary
British policy that the decision to terminate the alliance came about largely
because of the ‘disastrous possibility ’ that Japan might lead Britain into war with
the United States.75 The belief that the continuation of the alliance might have
averted later Japanese aggression was only referred to, rather derisively, in a short
footnote.76
V
The battle over the death of the alliance was thus neatly poised in the inter-war
period, and it was a competition deﬁned ﬁrst and foremost by ideological pref-
erences. But how did the contested view that the alliance’s death was a disaster
become received wisdom in the post-war period? The answer lies partly in its
occasional appearance in the memoirs and retrospectives that appeared during
and after the Second World War. These books, which were written with the
beneﬁt of hindsight and for the aggrandizement of their authors’ reputations,
criticized many of the decisions made in the inter-war period, and tended to do
so from a realpolitik rather than an internationalist perspective. Most of them
focused entirely on European events, but a few also dealt with the origins of the
war in the Paciﬁc. In this ﬁeld the Washington conference was a ripe target, for
self-evidently it had not fulﬁlled its promise to bring peace and stability to east
Asia. If the decisions at Washington had been misguided, it naturally followed
that history might have taken a diﬀerent path if the alliance had been maintained.
Thus the idea that Britain had paid a heavy price for foolishly discarding its
72 ‘Note upon Sir Cecil Clementi’s despatch’, unattributed and undated [Feb. 1930?], NA
WO106/130. 73 G. F. Hudson, The Far East in world politics (London, 1937), p. 202. 74 Ibid.
75 G. E. Hubbard, British Far Eastern policy (New York, 1943 edn), p. 33. See also Stephen King-Hall,
Our own times, 1913–1938: a political and economic survey (London, 1938), p. 226; E. H. Carr, Britain : a study
of foreign policy from the Versailles treaty to the outbreak of war (London, 1939), p. 58; G. M. Gathorne-Hardy,
A short history of international aﬀairs, 1920–1939 (London, 1950 edn), pp. 63–5; and Spinks, ‘The termin-
ation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’, pp. 321–40. 76 Hubbard, British Far Eastern policy, p. 33.
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formerly loyal ally was repeated for a new generation. The most notable author to
include this argument was that great generator of historical myths, Winston
Churchill. In The gathering storm he observed portentously that ‘The annulment
caused a profound impression in Japan, and was viewed as the spurning of an
Asiatic Power by the Western world. Many links were sundered which might
afterwards have proved of decisive value to peace. ’77 Typically, Churchill
neglected to mention in this account that he had been one of the alliance’s
opponents in 1921.78 This interpretation of events was also present in the memoirs
of the former ﬁrst sea lord, Lord Chatﬁeld, and those of three ﬁgures who had
served during their careers at the Tokyo embassy, Sir Robert Craigie, Sir
Thomas Hohler, and Major-General F. S. G. Piggott, and was also hinted at in
the memoirs of Lord Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign
Oﬃce for most of the 1930s.79 The ‘ghost ’ thus continued to exert its grip, and the
fact that many in the inter-war period had viewed Japan’s record in the Great
War with disquiet and had not regretted the end of the alliance was largely
forgotten except by a few specialists.
Even more signiﬁcant was that the original explicitly conservative ideological
edge to the pro-alliance argument found new adherents in the ‘declinist ’ school of
British historians that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The most detailed criti-
cism of the termination of the alliance appeared in Correlli Barnett’s The collapse of
British power, which was published in 1972. Drawing on the newly released minutes
of the Imperial Conference of 1921, Barnett noted the grave choice facing Britain
in 1921, including the diﬃculties posed by the naval issue, but argued that in the
end facile pro-American sentiment led Britain to make the wrong decision. In
making his case, he relied heavily on the arguments made at the conference by
Billy Hughes, whose hard-headed realism he contrasted with the naivety of
Meighen. He portrayed the decision to allow the treaty with Japan to lapse as a
betrayal of Britain’s traditional balance-of-power thinking, which should have
taught Lloyd George and his cabinet that they needed to renew the alliance in
order to contain the United States.80 This clearly echoed the anti-‘Atlanticist ’
views of the National Review and the ‘die-hards ’. Indeed, with Barnett’s reference
to Britain’s ‘grovelling ardour ’ for America, and his characterization of the
Washington conference as ‘one of the major catastrophes of British history ’, it
read almost as if Leo Maxse were still with us.81 Barnett was also similar to Maxse
in that he relied on the ‘ghost ’ of the alliance. He aﬃrmed that Japanese
77 Winston S. Churchill, The gathering storm (London, 1985 edn), p. 13. For Churchill’s memoirs, see
David Reynolds, In command of history : Churchill ﬁghting and writing the Second World War (London, 2004).
78 See Churchill memorandum, 4 July 1921, in Martin Gilbert, ed., Winston S. Churchill, III,
Companion, part III (London, 1977), p. 1450.
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assistance had been vital to the British war eﬀort between 1914 and 1918, but
did not mention that many, both in the Foreign Oﬃce and the Royal Navy, did
not believe this to be true. He contended that ‘ the Japanese had always been
scrupulously loyal ’, but made no mention of the ‘ twenty-one demands ’ or
Japanese links to Asian revolutionaries.82 The fact that British and Japanese
attitudes towards the ‘open door ’ in China diﬀered so markedly was referred to
in passing, but there was no recognition that this fundamental disagreement
meant that any future alliance would have been built on the most unsound of
foundations.
Barnett and the other ‘declinist ’ writers were able to make an impact, because
their accounts of the end of the alliance were framed within wide-ranging books
that also covered the area of greatest interest to historians, namely the appease-
ment of Germany. Their polemical writings thus reached a larger audience than
the more detailed analyses provided by those who specialized in the region. As a
result it was the former’s view that came to be adopted, often without its overtly
political connotations, as a historical cliche´ that was regularly aired whenever the
alliance came up for discussion.
V I
The ‘ghost ’ has thus survived intact until the present day and continues to hinder
understanding of both the nature of the alliance itself and the decisions made at
the Washington conference. But by looking carefully at the myth and studying its
assumptions, it is possible to strip away the sentiment and nostalgia that has
encumbered our vision. The ﬁrst part in this process is to realize that the myth
presupposes that the alliance was something it never really was, close and har-
monious. It needs to be understood that this interpretation has its roots not in
solid fact but in the fantasyland of Leo Maxse and the ‘die-hards ’, who deliber-
ately created a positive image of the alliance as part of their struggle to resist the
rise of ‘new diplomacy’ and all of its works. In reality the situation was that even
before 1921 British and Japanese interests in east Asia seriously diverged. Thus the
end of the alliance did not cause Anglo-Japanese alienation but in fact can be seen
as symptomatic of the steady erosion of the ties between the two countries. Any
renewal of the alliance would most likely have been a fruitless attempt to stop the
haemorrhaging. It is also essential to recognize that the problems that eventually
compromised the security arrangements agreed at Washington would have pro-
vided a severe test for any agreement. For example, can it really be argued that
the alliance would have better weathered the storms created by the rise of
Chinese nationalism and the arrival of the depression? In addition, it is vital to
understand that in 1921 Britain had little choice but to opt for co-operation with
the United States, for only that option provided a realistic chance of settling the
many strategic and economic problems that beset the fragile post-Paris order ;
82 Ibid., p. 251.
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the alliance with Japan provided no practical alternative. This gamble may not
always have paid oﬀ, but surely America’s intermittent friendship was preferable
to its permanent hostility.
While the National Review’s interpretation of the alliance may be an obstacle to
understanding the events of 1921, it is though signiﬁcant on its terms, for this
politically charged argument necessarily sheds light on the time in which it was
made. The debate over the alliance’s termination illuminates the fact that, while
historians of the vagaries of British foreign policy in the inter-war period have
paid much attention to matters of strategy and resources, domestic public opinion
and ideological arguments should not be ignored. What is apparent from the
battle over the alliance’s reputation is that after the Great War there was at heart
a profound ambivalence in British society about how to approach international
politics. Britain was precariously caught between the certainties of the ‘old dip-
lomacy’, as symbolized by the alliance, and the promise of the ‘new’, which was
encapsulated by the League. In the conﬂict over which way to turn recent history
became one of the battleﬁelds and in that process myths were created that linger
to this very day. The failure to cohere ideologically in favour of one approach to
foreign policy was thus arguably for Britain as much a problem as its indecision
over its strategic priorities.
Thus, as Beatrice Heuser and Cyril Buﬀet have shown in their recent edited
collection on myths in international relations, politically charged interpretations
of the past create both challenges and opportunities.83 Myths create obstacles to
research because they obscure historical events with a web of rhetoric. In some
cases, as with the alliance, the initial impulses behind a particular interpretation
of history can be forgotten, thus allowing what was once a controversial opinion
to become widely accepted and repeated. This can only be overcome by ﬁrst
acknowledging that the myth exists and then by engaging in an excavation to
allow the original judgements of decision-makers and the informed public to
emerge untarnished. At the same time, however, the very process of dis-
entanglement provides an opportunity to study the period in which the myth was
formed and to come to a clearer understanding of its intellectual and ideological
roots. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, its alluring ghost, summoned up
by the National Review and its ilk, provides a fascinating insight into the inter-war
years ; yet for the sake of understanding the events of 1921 its exorcism is long
overdue.
83 Heuser and Buﬀet, eds., Haunted by history, pp. 259–74.
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